

# AN ANALYSIS OF CROSS BORDER TERRORISM BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

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## ABSTRACT

*Today, terrorism is one of the major threats being faced by most of the world states. India has witnessed violent internal conflicts for the past three decades. India's independence in 1947 from the British colonial rule and its subsequent division into two nations – India and Pakistan - has sowed the seeds of continuing conflict between the two countries since their independence. The partition of India was primarily based on the religious divide between the two communities – the Hindus and the Muslims. After India's partition, the major issue of conflict between the two countries has been the Muslim dominated northern state of Jammu and Kashmir, currently a part of India. This bilateral conflict has had international implications over the years. Decades of conflict, which includes three major wars, has contributed to a nuclear race between the two countries and growth of terrorism in the region. These two regional outcomes of the conflict have assumed global significance with the growing international threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The paper analyses the cross border terrorism between India and Pakistan. The paper also emphasizes on the policy alternatives for building peace between India and Pakistan, which are likely to enhance the prospects of maintaining peace and security.*

**Keywords:** *Conflict, Government Policies, International Peace, India and Pakistan, Kashmir,*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Today, terrorism is one of the major threats being faced by most of the world states. India has witnessed violent internal conflicts for the past three decades. India and Pakistan are two countries which are endeavouring to deal with the issue of cross border terrorism since the time of independence, 1947. The partition of India was primarily based on the religious divide between the two communities – the Hindus and the Muslims. After India's partition, the major issue of conflict between the two countries has been the Muslim dominated northern state of Jammu and Kashmir, currently a part of India. One of the most important issues with which almost every country is trying to overcome is of combating militancy, terrorism and nuclear menace. The entire growth of country comes at a screeching halt if the security concerns are not timely met and addressed. Manifestations of threat range from communal/sectarian violence to jihadist terrorism, separatist insurgencies in northeast and Naxalite extremist militancy. Most external threats emanate from an unsettled boundary dispute with China and ongoing cross-border jihadist terrorism in J&K sponsored terrorism, supported by ISI and Pakistan-based Islamist fundamentalist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad who, in turn, are inextricably linked with international jihadist groups like Taliban and Al Qaida. Threat from Bangladesh

assumes serious dimensions since it became a base for northeast insurgent groups like ULFA and Naga factions. Of late, it has also been serving as a conduit for ISI sponsored infiltration of terrorists along India and Bangladesh's porous border. To cap it, nuclear threat from neighbouring states and from jihadist groups have the potential of using nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, significant being China-Pakistan nuclear nexus. Terrorism can be classified into Political terrorism for political purposes and non-political terrorism- which exhibits "conscious design to create and maintain a high degree of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or collective gain rather than the achievement of a political objective." The very fact that India shares its border with many nations, it makes its task of internal and external security more difficult. The ethnic mix of population also adds fuel to the fire, when ideology and aspiration of all religion in India are not met concurrently by the govt. This has been seen in Punjab terrorism in 1980s, followed by Assam and J&K problem in 1990s and now as Maoism in state of Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, west Bengal and Orissa. Boundary problems, difficulties and hence border security and defence are universal phenomena. Borders mark the extent of sovereignty which a State can claim in relation to another. As such, they are usually associated with defence arrangements and often wars. Today the problem has reached an alarming proportion in some parts of the world and in particular in Asia where the concern of leaders has been to formulate and implement their foreign policy objectives towards the permanent resolutions of these border problems in their interactions. These interactions can either be co-operative or confliction depending on factors such as relationship between border populations, presence of resources along the borders and of course the nature of regime. This paper basically deals with cross border terrorism question and that always remains unanswered and explains reasons behind such cross border threats which plonk the life of the citizens of the country under menace.

## II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

**Evans, (2000)** explains how Kashmir problem was dominated by guest militants with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency and how Indian counter measures and election in 1996 turned the situation in Kashmir. Though tourists ignored Kashmir for nine years from 1990, it is heartening to note the revival of tourist interest in Kashmir in 1999. Kargil intrusion dampened the spirit and tourists left the valley in May 1999. Knowledge of the organisation, structure, safety measures of security forces inspired terrorists to initiate attacks on bases of security forces. Failure on the part of State Government in bringing expected changes, IC 814 hijack in December 1999 and release of three hard core militants, failure in delivering normalisation through counter-terror policies, lack of political will and Pakistan's support increased terror activities and resulted in damaging the situation in Kashmir further.

**Basrur, (2002)** commenting on the process of change in Indian strategic thinking after Kargil conflict in 1999, insists for an alternative approach to tackle Pakistani intervention in Kashmir. After Kargil, a range of initiatives was subsequently undertaken to improve the political environment as a result of which the Agra summit took place. The depth of Pakistani involvement in Kashmir remained unchanged and India's conventional advantage was neutralised as they too had nuclear weapons. The author opines prolonged adherence to misunderstood notions of limited war and strategic space are not good sign for the region's future.

**Henderson, (2003)** evaluated the implications of Bali bombing on tourism sector. Consequent to bombing, tourists, operators and investors avoided areas associated with danger. Tourism marketing and developing agencies played a crucial role in devising and implementing strategies to attract tourists back. Though visitors have been enticed to Bali from around the globe, the bombings instantly created aftershocks. There was a fall in tourists' arrivals due to travel advisories, reduced air transport services, and occupancy rates in large hotels. The bombing affected small enterprises, taxi drivers, the garment and souvenir sellers, tour guides, craftsmen, hawkers and vendors. In order to revive tourism, focus and priority was given to domestic tourism sector. Government's approaches used to increase inflow of domestic tourists'. Safety and Security became central marketing themes and adequate measures were adopted to handling such complex situations.

**Chen & Chen, (2003)** attempted to assess terrorism effects on travel arrangements and tourism practices after September 11 WTC twin tower attack in USA. Airlines suffered decline in passenger load, followed by slump in hotel occupancy rate and heavy security deployment at highly raised buildings, heavily crowded public places, and in commercial complexes. Casinos, sporting events, state tourism, and international tourism received setback to maximum extent and US stock values went down by seven percent. People showed less interest in visiting New York and rather liked to visit beaches to avoid terror attacks. People feared to use air transportation. When the fear of terror attack persists, new marketing ideas centered on community based tourism may reduce the impact of terror effect on travel business.

**Sali, (2005)** addressed the significance of ineffective methods of fighting terrorism. He defines terrorism as the unlawful application of violence or the threat of its application for political purposes and insists that the root cause of terrorism has to be sought out and then cured by means of moral persuasion. The author clearly supports the view that terrorism is a great evil to the peace of society and has to be eliminated with lesser evil approaches.

**Rajagopalan, (2007)** dealt with India's counter – insurgency strategy. Author found India views terrorism as a political problem. India adopted soft approaches with minimum force utilisation and solve it. Globally armies adopt repressive measures and this forced terrorists to follow various guerrilla tactics which in turn compels state army to deploy more strength and undertakes large operations to hold territory. When state army maintains huge force to keep insurgents away from population and economic centers, terrorists used limited capacity to harass people by attacking at unexpected place and time. The author suggests modulate use of force along with political compromises will be more effective.

**Goswami, (2009)** analysed the merits and demerits of 'trust and nurture' Strategy in counter-insurgency operations. He found that distrust existing between security forces and local population is the main hurdle in solving the problem. In other words, Strategy of 'trust and nature' can be developed through democratic political culture, well measured military methods, special counter insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness. Though change in approaches is hard to digest by army researchers in similar subjects will help to solve the problem effectively.

### III. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

1. To make an analysis on the theoretical concept of cross-border terrorism.
2. To analyse the bilateral conflict has had international implications over the years.



3. To find out the problems and challenges on cross border terrorism in India.
4. To study the policies taken by government of India.

#### IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The present study is descriptive and analytical in nature. The data used for the study is secondary in nature and has been collected from annual reports of Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, various journals and periodicals, newspapers and different working committee reports.

#### V. CROSS BORDER TERRORISM BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY:

Cross-border terrorism has emerged as a great threat to the security of India. Terrorism originating from across the border has slowly attempted to strangle the democracy and sovereignty of India. By its nature, the term “terrorism” is bound up in political controversy. It is a concept with a very negative connotation. Because terrorism implies the killing and maiming of innocent people, no country wants to be accused of supporting terrorism or harbouring terrorist groups. At the same time, no country wants what it considers to be a legitimate use of force to be considered terrorism. An old saying goes, “One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” While there is no universal definition of terrorism, various experts point out that there are common elements to most terrorist acts. Acts of terrorism usually are committed by groups who do not possess the political power to change policies they view as intolerable. Middle Eastern terrorism intensified in the 1970s in response to defeats of Arab nations in wars with Israel over the Palestine issue. Convinced that further wars were futile, a number of countries, including Egypt, sought peace with Israel. This enraged groups within those countries dedicated to the defeat of Israel, who then turned to terrorism.

Terrorists choose targets and actions to maximise the psychological effect on a society or government. Their goal is to create a situation in which a government will change its policies to avoid further bloodshed or disruption. For these reasons, terrorists often choose methods of mass destruction, such as bombings, and target transportation or crowded places to increase anxiety and fear. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the USA on September 11, 2001 brought transnational terrorism to attention. This kind of terrorism is also known as cross-border terrorism. Cross-border terror groups do not confine themselves either territorially or ideologically to a particular country or region. They are global in orientation, readily moving funds, men and material from one place to another. Groups like the Palestine nationalist groups and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) also crossed state borders to launch attacks, to smuggle arms and to seek refuge. The IRA got weapons from Libya and launched attacks across Britain; it also launched a one-off attack in Germany and plotted an assault on British forces in Gibraltar. Palestinian ‘terrorists’ crossed into Israeli territory, or what they considered Palestinian territory, and sought refuge in states like Egypt and Syria. They hijacked aeroplanes across the world, took hostage Israeli contestants at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, and infamously hijacked an Italian cruise ship in 1985. However, these groups were politically and organisationally tied to a particular territory. As international experts Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev put it, these groups pursued largely

‘irredentist aims’ and built up their memberships ‘from a specific population—even if they sought the sponsorship of a foreign patron for arms and logistical support’.

Today’s cross-border groups view territory expediently, as a base from which they can organise their campaigns and plot their attacks. The new breed of Islamic terror groups are, according to Takeyh and Gvosdev, ‘explicitly global’—in the sense that they have broadly anti-Western views rather than locally defined objectives, and their members hail from different states rather than from a distinct community with distinct interests.

Where the armed groups of old sought to build or remake nation states, today’s cross-border terrorists feed off the demise of state authority. Where national liberation movements sought to redraw state boundaries, cross-border groups think nothing of moving from one failed state to another. Where the earlier violent groups focussed their energies on achieving limited local aims, even as they carried out international operations, today’s terror groups talk about ‘spreading jihad’ around the globe. Some analysts believe that it was Western intervention in, the third world, specifically the ‘humanitarian intervention’ of the post-Cold War period that encouraged the emergence of today’s cross-border terrorists. By undermining state authority and notions of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention created the space for the rise of non- state actors. And by internationalising local conflicts, Western intervention did much to encourage the flouting of traditional borders and the movement of armed groups between territories.

Through the process of weakening state authority and internationalising conflicts, Western intervention has given rise to a new kind of terrorist—terrorists who, as Pentagon officials put it, ‘respect no borders, no boundaries and no state institutions’, who feed off the absence of state authority and move across territories in the execution of their ‘global’ campaigns. According to Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, a Professor at the Naval War College, US, the world may be divided into three areas, the core, the seam and the gap states, based on their level of globalisation. Core states are those thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows and collective security. States in this category feature stable governments, rising standards of living and more deaths by suicide than murder. Core states include North America, much of South America, the European Union, Russia, Japan, and Asia’s emerging economies (most notably China and India), Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Gap states are those where globalisation is thinning or absent, plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder and most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. Seam states are those, lying between the Core and Gap, which are in transition to being fully globalised. Seam states include: Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.

## **VI. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM IN INDIA:**

### **1. Geographical factors:**

**a) Length of borders:** India has 14818 kilometers of land borders and a coast line of 7516.6 kilometers. All states except Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Telangana, Delhi and Haryana have an international border or a coast line.

**b) Extreme geography:** Also, borders are quite complex and almost every type of extreme geography is present at different borders viz. Mountains, deserts, fertile lands, swampy marshes or tropical evergreen jungles. Lack of proper security in inhospitable areas further aids cross border terrorism.

**c) Shifting courses of rivers** located near boundaries further compound the problem of border management e.g. Padma and Brahmaputra in the east and Ravi in the north.

### **2. India's economic and military rise:**

India is emerging as an economically and military strong nation in both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. Pakistan views India's rise as a threat to its own ambitions. It is thus resorting to cross border terrorism tactics to keep India engaged in proxy wars and divert its resources from other developmental issues. It aims to degrade India's conventional superiority through a process of **strategic fatigue**.

### **3. India's neighbourhood challenge:**

India is like island of democracy between seas of anarchical or instable states. Probably, no other neighbouring country has experienced uninterrupted democratic regime for more than 15 years.

Additionally, in some countries there is cultural radicalism targeted at India, and terrorists and mafia groups are patronized by some of India's neighbouring states.

### **4. Territorial Ambitions of Pakistan**

Pakistan having failed to grab Kashmir despite fighting conventional wars has resorted to the strategy of terrorism. Conventional wars are expensive and the chances of achieving political objectives through wars have diminished due to the development of nuclear weapons and the possible international reaction.

In such a case, proxy war is a low- cost and no- case option but best suited to promote Pakistan's geo political, diplomatic and military interest, not only to wrest Kashmir but also to gain forward strategic depth.

### **5. Boundary disputes**

Unsolved border disputed with Pakistan in the area of Sir Creek in Gujarat, the LOC in J&K, AGPL portion in Siachin and with China in Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh and Transk-Karakoram tract further compound the problem.

## **VII. INDIAN CONCERNS TOWARDS CROSS BORDER TERRORISM:**

**1. State sponsored terrorism:** The links between top army personnel, bureaucrats and political leaders, on the one hand, and terrorists and drug barons, on the other, have acquired a measure of legitimacy under the banner of Islam and jihad in Pakistan.

**2. Pakistan's failure to act** against terror outfits: Despite being handed over evidence of Pakistan based terrorists' involvement in Pathankot terror attacks, and the Pakistan JIT team being allowed access to the terror site, Pakistan has not taken any steps that indicate its intent to act tough on terror.

**3. The China-Pakistan nexus** has given rise to external concerns such as covert assistance in Pakistan's nuclear and missile program. Also, China continues to block India's bid to get Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar (accused in the Parliament terror attack case and, more recently, the Pathankot attack) listed as a terrorist by the United Nations. China has also previously blocked India's demand for taking action under the

Security Council's anti-terrorism resolutions against Pakistan for releasing Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Zaki-ur Lakhvi—the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

3. Recent joint military exercises between Pakistan and **Russia** (traditionally seen as India's close ally) despite ongoing India-Pakistan hostilities also paint a picture of concern.

4. India has also become the target in the global jihadi plan of outfits such as ISIS and Al Qaeda which are not only instigating violence through sleeping modules, but also attract educated urban youths to spread terror agenda on social media and to fight in alien lands. There are over hundred Indian youths who are estimated to be fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Also, the radicalization and recruitment of youth for such terror organisations has become more sophisticated, thanks to the internet.

5. Pakistan's funding, arming, training and diplomatic support to varied terrorist groups active in Kashmir has emboldened the terrorists all over the world. India's counter terrorism set-up:

- a) **The state police and its intelligence set-up:** Under India's federal Constitution, the responsibility for policing and maintenance of law and order is that of the individual states. The central government can only give them advice, financial help, training and other assistance to strengthen their professional capabilities and share with them the intelligence collected by it.
- b) **The national intelligence community:** This consists of the internal intelligence agency (Intelligence Bureau), the external intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing), the Defence Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces and the National Investigation Agency.
- c) The IB collects terrorism-related intelligence inside the country and RAW does it outside.
- d) The DIA and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces essentially collect tactical intelligence during their counter-terrorism operations in areas such as Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, etc, where they are deployed.
- e) The NIA is the Central Counter Terrorism Law Enforcement Agency which collects, collates and analyses counter terrorism investigation.
- f) **Central Armed Police Forces:** These include:
  - g) **Central Reserve Police Force**, responsible for maintaining law and order and containing insurgency.
  - h) **Central Industrial Security Force**, responsible for physical security at airports and sensitive establishments;
  - i) **The National Security Guards**, a specially trained intervention force to terminate terrorist situations such as hijacking, hostage-taking, etc; and
  - j) **The Special Protection Group**, responsible for the security of the prime minister and former prime ministers.
  - k) The **Border Security Force**, responsible for guarding India's land border during peace time and preventing transnational crime.
  - l) **Paramilitary forces:** These include the Assam Rifles, Special Frontier Force, and the Indian Coast Guard, which assist the police in counter-terrorism operations when called upon to do so.
  - m) **The Army:** Their assistance is sought as a last resort when the police and paramilitary forces are not able to cope with a terrorist situation. But in view of Pakistan's large-scale infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir and



the presence and activities of a large number of Pakistani mercenaries, many of them ex-servicemen, the army has a more active, permanent and leadership role in counter-terrorism operations here.

n) **Recent initiatives** like NATGRID and CMS to aid security agencies: The National Intelligence Grid or NATGRID is the integrated intelligence grid connecting databases of core security agencies of the Government of India to collect comprehensive patterns of intelligence that can be readily accessed by intelligence agencies.

#### 6. Issues with India's Counter Terrorism Set-Up:

- a. India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; there is **no doctrine**, and most of our responses are kneejerk.
- b. **Unintelligent Intelligence Infrastructure:** India has a multitude of intelligence agencies. Coordination between them on the ground is not up to the mark. Experts also opine that there is competition among intelligence agencies which prevents information sharing.
- c. A crucial weakness that most intelligence agencies suffer from is the lack of resources. They most often fall short of trained officers and finances.

### VIII. THE POLICIES AND STRATEGY ON CROSS BORDER TERRORISM:

1. India needs to formulate a comprehensive national anti-terror strategy which must address many issues – defence, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, economic development, education, promotion of socio-political justice – within the context of policies promoting national security.

#### 2. Reforming domestic anti-terror apparatus:

- a) Immediately beef up NIA
- b) To create a strong NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Centre)
- c) ensure that terrorism fighting organizations are equipped with adequate physical infrastructure, manned with suitably trained manpower and do not face a cash crunch; Most importantly, the agencies must be least in number and have a mechanism to seamlessly communicate and strike whenever needed, without jurisdictional conflicts.

3. **Military Options:** A strong state with the ability to give as well as it gets is a pre-requisite for peace. Military options like the recent surgical strikes across LoC not only enhance the deterrence in place against such attacks, but also ensure that the state-jihadi nexus is constricted.

4. **Diplomatic Dialogue-** Henry Kissinger, an American political scientist has written that “nations cooperate for long periods only when they share common political goals and that... policy must focus on these goals rather than on the mechanisms used to reach them.” Thus, India must diplomatically engage not only Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, so as to formulate policies for cooperation in economic, military, cultural and terrorism fields and ensure mutual quest for regional peace, prosperity and stability.

5. **International Support**– to further a policy of non-violent “compellence”.

a) India must designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and continue its efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally as it has successfully done in South Asia (SAARC). To impose further political isolation, India could convince its partners to postpone bilateral meetings with Pakistan or delay visa processing.

b) In more tangible economic terms, India and its partners could seek to raise the prominence of anti-terrorism issues at the IMF to condition further financing for Pakistan on cracking down on terrorist groups that attack other states.

c) Furthermore, India could seek an advance commitment from the United States and other major powers to cut security assistance to Pakistan in case of a future terrorist attack in India. Such agreements would raise the costs for any authorities that would subsequently violate them. China and U.S. both have great interests in stability between Pakistan and India. Both could be expected to press India and Pakistan to uphold any agreements and to contribute to fact-finding if there are disputes over compliance.

**6. Internal Stability**– India needs to understand the importance of maintaining peace and harmony amongst all religions and communities in India, with special reference to Muslim and people belonging to NE states and the RED CORRIDOR (Maoism). Pakistan has for decades exploited the dissatisfaction and given covert and overt assistance in fuelling insurgency in these regions. The intelligence agencies have an important role to play as the eyes and ears of the government in different communities to detect feelings of anger and alienation which need immediate attention.

7. Solving border issues with wider consultation, initiating confidence building measures and more and more people to people contact along with improved trade across the border would help.

8. Use of the latest **surveillance technologies** available such drones, unmanned Aerial vehicle such as Nishant, Rustam-1 etc. to detect the presence of unwarranted activities across the border whether land or maritime.

## IX. CONCLUSION

Terrorism, the “cancer of the modern world”, a growing threat to the maintenance of an orderly society and a scourge which undermines development, economic and political stability and democratic institution is one of the most challenging problems of the modern times. An unethical, low cost, surrogate war undermines the full exercise of human rights and threatens the stability of many societies in the world. The Indian government's initiative to tackle terrorism by cooperating with Pakistan raises serious questions. In fact before developing any strategy to deal with Pakistan, which has been sponsoring and abetting terrorism in India, the government must formulate its own strategy to deal with internal security. Instead of relying support from the United States or from the military rulers of Pakistan, India must rely on its own mechanism to deal with terrorism and other extremist outfits like the Naxal movements.

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